The investigation began with an immediate question: how had an external user reached internal servers? Anomalous NTLM logons led me to devices that were not domain-joined. I correlated their internal addresses with VPN sessions to connect remote access to the activity inside the network.
I reviewed several months of VPN history and used source-IP frequency analysis to identify related access through two compromised accounts. For each identified malicious session, I followed its VPN-assigned address through network logs and reconstructed the systems reached. VirusTotal and AbuseIPDB supplied context for the external IPs.
The sessions showed network discovery and access to a sensitive file share. I identified a share configuration that permitted unauthenticated access, and we deployed Velociraptor on the hosts reached by those sessions to investigate further.
The result was a session-by-session account of the observed intrusion and a specific access-control weakness to address. I found no successful privilege escalation in the available evidence. The original source of the stolen credentials remained unproven.
Methods, evidence & technical decisions
Connecting remote access to internal logons
I traced anomalous NTLM logons to non-domain devices and correlated their internal addresses with VPN assignment records. This connected remote sessions to server access. VirusTotal and AbuseIPDB supplied supporting IP reputation context; the session records established the link.
Open this detail ↗Scoping sessions and affected hosts
I analysed months of VPN history for recurring source IPs and related access through two compromised accounts. I followed the VPN-assigned addresses through network logs to reconstruct discovery activity and systems reached. Velociraptor extended the investigation to those hosts.
Open this detail ↗The exposed share and the evidence limit
The observed sessions accessed a sensitive share whose configuration allowed unauthenticated access. No successful privilege escalation was found in the available records. The origin of the compromised VPN credentials remained unknown.
Open this detail ↗Skills used in this work