By the time I began the investigation, SentinelOne had quarantined NetSupport and the original detection logs were unavailable. Our EDR agent had been installed after containment. I needed to reconstruct the earlier intrusion from the Windows artefacts that remained.
I correlated Prefetch records for curl, tar and rundll32 with the names and timestamps of malicious .bat and .dll files. VirusTotal and ANY.RUN provided context for the indicators and helped me follow the dropper and remote-access activity.
I examined the user profile, browser history, Outlook data files and common download locations for the entry point. A high volume of spam was visible, but I could not connect an attachment or phishing message directly to the infection. Quick Assist session evidence and Microsoft WebView activity instead placed remote-support setup immediately before malicious execution.
I shared that timeline with the client. The affected user then described a spam flood followed by a call impersonating IT support, corroborating a likely vishing entry path. My report reconstructed the remote-support sequence and set out recovery steps and control recommendations, with the missing early logs reflected in its conclusions.
Methods, evidence & technical decisions
Investigating after containment
SentinelOne had quarantined NetSupport before our EDR agent was installed. With the original detection logs unavailable, I used Prefetch, user-profile artefacts and support-session evidence to reconstruct earlier activity and checked them against a common timeline.
Open this detail ↗The artefacts that connected the sequence
Prefetch linked execution of curl, tar and rundll32 with associated .bat and .dll filenames. I checked those indicators in VirusTotal and ANY.RUN, then correlated browser and Outlook artefacts with Quick Assist logs and Microsoft WebView activity. The support session preceded malicious execution.
Open this detail ↗Corroborating the likely entry path
The user account of a spam flood and fake IT-support call fitted the technical timeline. Together, they supported a likely vishing route into the remote-support session. The report included recovery and control recommendations; incomplete early telemetry limited visibility of the full intrusion.
Open this detail ↗Skills used in this work