Threat-Informed Detection Engineering

Turn Red Team findings into detection and hardening

Turned Red Team findings into SQL and SMB detections, credential hunting and identity hardening, as part of wider work building over 15 detections and tuning over 50 alerts, primarily individual instances and associated metadata.

UK Water UtilityDetection engineering, threat hunting and defensive follow-up2 min read

A Red Team report needs to become defensive work the SOC can use. I analysed the assessment, translated the findings into a prioritised backlog and built selected detections while working on the monitoring and identity weaknesses behind the attack paths.

I analysed attack paths spanning external access and footholds in IT and OT environments. I mapped observed behaviour to MITRE ATT&CK and prioritised detection, hunting and engineering work according to impact, telemetry requirements and likely signal fidelity.

One finding involved abuse of Microsoft SQL Server’s xp_cmdshell stored procedure to execute operating-system commands. I worked on SQL server monitoring coverage and built an alert for a command shell process spawned by the SQL Server process, making that transition from database activity to host execution visible to the SOC.

I also built an SMB enumeration alert using Microsoft Defender XDR DeviceNetworkEvents. It identifies anomalous activity where one unusual source IP probes SMB ports across multiple devices in a short interval. Alongside detection work, I hunted for plaintext passwords in files and configurations and addressed weak Active Directory passwords and NTLMv1 authentication.

Across my wider detection-engineering work, I built over 15 detections and tuned over 50 alerts, primarily individual instances and associated metadata within a bank of 160 active analytics rules, linking them to real-world threat scenarios and attack paths. SQL command execution and SMB enumeration are two specific examples of the Red Team follow-up. I also maintained the prioritised engineering backlog and prepared a redacted version for MDR collaboration, recording telemetry dependencies, implementation ownership and planned purple-team validation.

Methods, evidence & technical decisions

Translate attacker behaviour into detection requirements

I evaluated observed attacker behaviour against ATT&CK techniques, execution stage, impact and the telemetry needed to detect it. This connected defensive requirements to the intrusion paths demonstrated in the assessment.

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Prioritise the rule and the data it needs

I prioritised detection, hunting and engineering work while identifying the monitoring and attribution each item depended on. I followed through on SQL, SMB and identity findings and recorded the remaining work and dependencies for the SOC and MDR teams.

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Carry implemented work into the validation lifecycle

I built selected detections and carried out hunting and hardening work while keeping the broader coverage review, ownership and validation work in the backlog. Purple-team validation remained a planned next step for assessing the resulting detections against the relevant attack behaviour.

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Detect SQL Server spawning a command shell

The assessment demonstrated abuse of xp_cmdshell to execute operating-system commands through Microsoft SQL Server. I addressed and monitored SQL server coverage and built an alert for the parent-child relationship between the SQL Server process and a spawned command shell. This focuses detection on the host execution behaviour associated with the finding.

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Detect one source probing SMB across multiple devices

I used the DeviceNetworkEvents table in Microsoft Defender XDR to alert on anomalous SMB enumeration: one unusual source IP probing SMB ports on multiple different devices in a short period. The rule considers the spread of activity across devices and time, connecting individual network events to a reconnaissance pattern.

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Hunt for credentials and strengthen authentication

I hunted for plaintext passwords in files and configurations and addressed weak Active Directory passwords and NTLMv1 authentication. This work accompanied the SQL and SMB detections within the wider Red Team follow-up, connecting observed attack opportunities to credential exposure and authentication controls.

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Skills used in this work

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Detection engineeringSecurity engineering & assurance

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