After an NTLMv2 enforcement change, the Active Directory team needed evidence of how the affected servers were authenticating. I analysed Windows security events to establish whether Kerberos activity was present across the defined server set.
I correlated Windows SecurityEvent records and condensed the findings into a server-level view of observed authentication behaviour, giving the Active Directory team a clear basis for reviewing the change.
The analysis confirmed Kerberos activity on the reviewed servers. I reported the observed behaviour without treating Kerberos use as proof that every NTLM dependency had been removed.
Methods, evidence & technical decisions
Define what the change review needs to establish
Following NTLMv2 enforcement, I examined Windows authentication events to establish whether the affected servers were using Kerberos and provide evidence for the Active Directory change review.
Open this detail ↗Turn event data into a server-level finding
I analysed Windows SecurityEvent data by server and summarised the observed authentication behaviour, turning event records into findings the Active Directory team could use.
Open this detail ↗Distinguish Kerberos use from remaining NTLM dependencies
The review established observed Kerberos activity. Identifying remaining NTLM dependencies is a separate question, so I kept the conclusion tied to the authentication evidence examined.
Open this detail ↗Skills used in this work